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SCHUBERT OGDEN ON TRUTH,
MEANINGFULNESS, AND
RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

MarkS. McLeod / WestmontCollege

Iwish to discuss some problems arising inSchubert Ogden's view of
religiouslanguage. These problems can be appreciated only by grasping
several of his key definitions,and thus section I is largelyexpository.
II draws

Section

together several

of Ogden's

claims about

and

language

faith. Inso doing itshows an inconsistency,
suggesting thathis theory

of religious language
is incomplete.
with
understanding
problems
Ogden's

In the final section
of necessary

I discuss

assertion,

three

truth, and

meaningfulness.
I.

For Ogden, theology is a methodical attempt to bring together the

meaning of the Christian witness of faith and the truth about human
the former ex
existence,
evaluating
carefully the question whether
presses the latter.1 He writes:

Properly understood, the task of Christian theology is the

of the Christian witness
of
fully reflective understanding
to
for human existence.
faith as decisive
Consequently,
reflection is required to pursue
achieve
this task, theological
two essential ends:
of its
(1) to see to the appropriateness
in the sense of their congruence
inmeaning with
assertions,

the Christianwitness of faith;and (2) to see to the under
standabilityof its assertions, in the sense of theirmeaning

1.

Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the works of Schubert M.
Ogden. Cf. "The Point of Christology,"The Journal of Religion 55 (October
1975): 375; and "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology," in The Future of
Empirical Theology, ed. Bernard Meland (Chicago: The Universityof Chicago
Press,

1969), p. 66.
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and truth in terms of
istence as such.2

the conditions

established

with

ex

The Christianwitness to which he refers includes biblical, historical,
and

contemporary
expressions
to exist
symbols which comes

and
of faith; "the level of concepts
insofar as Christians undertake somehow

to formulateand express theirfaith in Jesus as theChrist."3 Theology

critical reflection on the Christian witness,
attempt to vindicate the truthclaims found therein.4
is a

and

as

such

is an

Relying on some distinctions formulatedby Stephen Toulmin,5
is true is to "commend itas worthyof
Ogden suggests that to say
like
"Truth" is an evaluative term, much
being believed or accepted."6
a
or
It
does
"not
"beautiful."
merely express
subjective prefer
"good"
of
ence, but has the force of claiming objective worth-specifically,
a
as
To
in
of
itself
credence."7
assertion
deserving
given
assessing

assert thata proposition is true is to assert (at leastminimally)that it
of the term
is valuable to believe the proposition.
Finally, the meaning
to
"truth" remains constant, but the criteria for truth vary from case
one
to
is
or
whether
to
Thus
discover
"field"
"field."8
true,
case,

must firstdiscover the fieldof discourse to which

belongs and then

whether utterances in that field can be said to be true or false.
the statements of the Christian witness and theology
For Ogden,
statements are in a field of
In other words,
can be true.
theological
such that truth can be predicated of itsmembers.
discourse
Consider,
forexample, some comments about "myth":
related
of three closely
by means
a
to
refers
certain
First, 'myth'
language or
functions to
like other languages,
form of speaking which,

'Myth' may
statements.

2.
3.

be

defined

30 (July1976): 244.
of ScriptureforTheology," Interpretation
"TheAuthority
"The Point of Christology,"

375.

4.

"Truth,Truthfulnessand Secularity,"Christianityand Crisis 31 (April5, 1971):

5.

Cf.
Stephen Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1950) and The Uses of Argument
Press, 1958).
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
"Mythand Truth" in The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: Har

58.

6.
7.
8.

per and Row.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.

Publishers,

1966), p.11.

112.
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some
field of
represent
(to re-present, to present again)
in a particular way.
the field of
human experience
Second,
of myth represents
is our
that the language
experience
our
as
awareness
world
selves
the
internal
of
and
original

included in the circumambientrealitywithinwhich all things

come

to be, are what

they are, and

pass

away.

Third, the

particularway inwhich the language of myth representsthis

awareness
external

in our derived
is in terms and categories
based
our ordinary
as
the
of
of
reality
perception
object

experience.9

The influenceof Bultmann is obvious; demythologizingis a program to
is
That
followed.10
is, "to claim that a given mythical assertion
true, although not literally so, is to commit oneself to state the mean
ing of the assertion at some point in non-mythical terms."11 Ogden's
are
criterion for the truth of myth is that "...
mythical assertions
true insofar as they so explicate our unforfeitable assurance
that life is

be

worthwhile that the understandingof faith theyrepresent cannot be
falsifiedby the essential conditions of life itself [italicshis].12 Thus
a myth is true only if it is unfalsifiedby and explicative of faith
understood
living."13
Two

as

"the confidence

or assurance

that life as

such

is worth

of explanation.
First, in discussing
three senses of
levels.
three
Consider
experience Ogden
distinguishes
the term "empirical."
First is the logical positivist's
limited notion of
the empirical as the data of the five physical senses.
Second
is the
notions

remain

in need

includes the nonsen
empirical which, following existentialist philosophy,
suous.
"It is defined by the understanding
that sense perception
is
neither the only nor even the primary mode
but is
of experience,
rather derived from a still more elemental awareness
both of ourselves
and of the world around us."14 Third is the sense of empirical deriving

9.

Ibid., p. 104.

10. Christ WithoutMyth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961). The Bultmannian her
(New York:
meneutical program is not only championed by Ogden, but promoted ina more
radical

11.
12.
13.
14.

form.

"Myth and Truth," p. 108.
Ibid., p. 116.
Ibid., p. 114.
"Present Prospects
for Empirical

Theology,"

p. 78.
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from Whiteheadian
ourselves

and

Whitehead's

philosophy,
other creatures,
terms, "the sense

which allows not only for a sense of
but a sense of worth, the Whole, or, in
of Deity" or "the intuition of holiness."15

it
to Ogden,
is quite broad, but, according
Whitehead's
empiricism
allows for both a successful
for
and
the
empirical theology
meaningful
ness of religious utterance.

The last notion ismetaphysics. Metaphysics is a "distinctfieldof

task it is to raise to the level
inquiry, whose
the fundamental assertions
that must
sciousness
each of us and that none of us can meaningfully
claims, if they are to be meaningful, are subject

of

reflective self-con

somehow

be made

by

deny."16 Metaphysical
to two demands:
that

theyare logicallyconsistent (bothwith themselvesand with others) and

that they apply "through our human experience."
There are two types of metaphysical
statement, contingent and
are
existential.
The criterion of truth for
Both, however,
necessary.
are true meta
statements
that
statements
is
'Those
metaphysical
I
not
to
which
could
avoid
be
true, at least im
believing
physically
if
were
or
I
or
to
at
believe
exist
all,
alternatively, they are
plicitly,
the statements which would
necessarily
apply through any of my ex
even my merely
was
experience

experiences,
provided only that
reflected
Necessary
sufficiently
upon."17
statements are "utterly positive and non-exclusive
in their
metaphysical
statements
applications
through experience."18
Contingent metaphysical
are not.
"I exist," for example,
need not be part of God's
experience,
it is said of some human being. What makes
"I exist" true is the
when
Thus contingent metaphysical
contingent state of affairs that I exist.
statements must be believed by some believer, that is, by some human
periences,
such an

conceivable

believer, if true at all, but not by all believers.
Necessary metaphysical
statements must be believed
by all believers, viz., human and divine.
statements are unfalsifiable by experience.
Necessary metaphysical
Drawing

the claims

together

about

metaphysical

assertions

and

experience,Ogden suggest thatall metaphysical statementsare empirical
therefore existential, although not in the positivist sense.
The test
is an empirical test, but of course
for meaningfulness
"empirical" is to

and

15.

Ibid., pp. 79, 80, 85.

18.

"God and Philosophy,"

"God and Philosophy: A Discussion with Anthony Flew," in The Journal of
Religion 48 (April1968): 171.
17. The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of Metaphysics," Process
Studies 5 (Spring 1975): 47.
16.

p.

171.
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V
be taken in the widest possible way.
Necessary metaphysical
are verified by all experience, but cannot be falsified by any.

assertions

II.

How does Ogden understandreligiouslanguage? ForOgden, the
of existence-of
complex experience
myself, others, and the
out of which all religious language
whole-is
the experience
itmust be understood.
In this
arises and in terms of which
sense
all religious
the
word
is
'God,'
including
language,
in which we express and
existential language, the language
refer to our own existence as selves related to others and to
thewhole.19
then, are existential, but it is only the most
assertions,
Religious
fundamental which cannot be falsified.
"Whatever must be said of its
...
is the logic of
grammar, the logic of 'the religious hypothesis'
most
existential assertions-the
fundamental of which neither are nor

could be merelyfactual" [italicshis].20
The most

are
fundamental religious statements, on this account,
are
not
What
of
assertions
which
metaphysical.
religious
metaphysical?
If there are factual
religious assertions,
surely they are falsifiable.
While he claims that "the foundational statements of religion, or, at any
rate,

of

Christianity,

logically

cannot

claim "emphaticallydoes not settle as

be

factually

falsified,"21

this

itmight be supposed to, the

basic
issue of falsification and belief, so far, at least, as specifically
It seems,
Christian belief is concerned."22
then, that some statements
of Christian witness are factually falsifiable.
I suggest that
Recall the three senses of "empirical" noted above.
are
to
of
these
three
kinds
the
statements:
factual, the
corresponding
the
are on
and
existential.
The
first
existential,
necessary
contingent
the level of science, the second on the level of nonsensuous
experience,

19.
20.

"How Does God Function in Human Life?" Christianityand Crisis 27 (May 15,
1967): 106.
"Theology and Falsification in Retrospect': A Reply," in The Logic of God:
Theology

21.
22.

and

Verification,

ed.

Malcolm

L. Diamond

and

Thomas

V.

Litzenburg

Co., 1975),pp. 293, 294.
(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill
"Falsificationand Belief," a review of Falsification and Belief by Alasdair
McKinnon, inReligious Studies 10 (March 1974): 40.
Ibid.
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related to worldly creatures, and the third on the level of nonsensuous
but related to God.
On Ogden's
view, these three levels of
For the factual,
language each have their own test of meaningfulness.

experience,

The contingentexistential
he admits a positivistictype of falsifiability.

are in principle
to nonsensuous
assertions,
corresponding
experience,
nonsensuous
statements
These
falsifiable by conceivable,
experience.
include claims about one's existence and the world as we are related to
it, and are falsifiable in the face of those contingent "facts."
(I might,
into existence.)
existential claims,
after all, not have come
Necessary
to neither sort of falsification, but,
being utterly positive, are open
to Ogden, are falsifiable nonetheless.
How can this be?
He
according

writes:

Despite

Flew's

. . . that the
falsifiability of this

assumption

are
assertion [thatGod exists] and its empirical falsifiability

the same,
there is an important difference between
The assertion
that God
is real, though not, on my
in principle empirically falsifiable, is not, for all
view, even
of that, beyond the possibility of being false.
For, were the
many thinkers correct who profess to find the very idea of
God
incoherent, the assertion of God's
reality would be not
and
falsifiable
but
false at that. That
false,
only
necessarily
not not be false-even
that
is, it could
though obviously,
simply
them.

kind of falsitywould be something quite differentfrom the

merely empirical kind.23

if true, are necessarily
true, and verified by all ex
assertions,
to Ogden,
But, according
perience.
they could be false. This is sup
to be the case
since the foundational assertions
of Christianity
posed

Such

may simplybe confused or self-contradictory.This kind of falsification
is the only kind applicable to metaphysical, noncontingentassertions.
(Byway of criticalnote, one must say that this is indeed an odd use
of "falsifiable."The claim that necessary truthscould be false seems
unless, perhaps, Ogden wants to make a distinction between
a matter of fact really necessary
and what merely appears,
to
be necessary.)
epistemically,
one
to be
shows a particular assertion
Accordingly, whenever
confused

what

is as

meaningful,
metaphysical

23.

one

also

assertions

shows

it to be

is to be

true. The very nature of such
Thus "in
verified by all experience.

"Response,"The PerkinsSchool of TheologyJournal26 (Winter1973): 52.
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in their logic are metaphysical
the case of theological assertions which
. . ., to establish their
to experience
reference
is equivalent
meaning by

to establishing their truth; for either they can be shown to refer

or else they are doubtfully meaningful
through all possible
experience,
as metaphysical
are verified by all
statements
Such
assertions."24
in their case,
To be meaningful,
is to be
experience, falsified by none.
But to be true as necessary
assertions
is to
empirically unfalsifiable.
with all experience.
If meaningful
be compatible
self-con
(not

tradictory), then true. Iftrue at all, then necessarily true.
How should we understand Ogden's
theory of religious language?
that there is a continuum from faith to theology.
At the
He suggests
one
end
of
the
continuum
has
reflection-critical
highest
theological
reflection on the witness of faith and human existence.
At the other
end one has the faith of humankind, where
"faith" is to be understood
as
type of) existential self-understanding.
(a Heideggerian
Ogden's
can be used to draw together all the pieces of the
continuum
suggested
picture.
"Faith," "witness," and
"theology" are all "understandings,"
yet
each is on a different level so far as reflection is concerned.
Theology

isobjective knowledge (in the existentialsense, which can be accounted

to Ogden,
under both kinds of nonsensuous
for, according
experience).
on a less reflective level, the mythical expres
is proclamation
Witness
sion of the existential understanding of the believer.25
use of "faith" some confusion appears.
In connection with Ogden's
these comments:

Consider

I should agree immediately
that there is somethingprofoundly

in supposing
be directly verified ....

mistaken

or could
of rationally

that faith itself either must
[Where the question

faith]does properlyarise is at the levelof thought
justifying
and speech throughwhich the existentialunderstandingof
faith

is theologically

explicated-provided,

of

course,

that

such thoughtand speech are held to have some genuine
cognitive

24.
25.

26.

import.26

"The Task of Philosophical Theology," in The Future of Philosophical
Theology,ed. R. Evans (Philadelphia:WestminsterPress, 1971),p. 80.

There

are

this

is not

several

germane

of witness,
varieties
to the argument.

the most
concrete
being
parables,
on parables
comments
Cf. some

Whitehead, cited byOgden inTheRealityofGod and OtherEssays, p. 81.
"Theology

and Objectivity,"

pp. 92, 93.
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but

by

Here we are told that faith is not a witness or proclamation
Further:
rather thatwhich is being explicated by such witness.
Even

though

faith itself is a

strictly existential

itself, but

phenomenon,

the witness of faith, in the sense of the actual lifeof the

in loving service,
takes
believer
perforce
and history and therefore has its necessary

in nature

place
empirical

aspect.

Ifone is to love his neighbouras himselfby serving him in
his actual needs and above all, by explicitlyconfrontinghim

with

the decision

of faith, one

must

always

risk some

em

pirical understandingof his actual historical situation in its
limitations and opportunities

Here

again,

faith Is the

life of

for relevant action.27
the believer,

the existential

situation,

and Ogden clearly distinguishes it from the empirical outworkingsof
latter is a form of witness which
is em
The
the existential situation.
. . . existential claims, there are . . . all
falsifiable.
"Beyond
pirically
in Scripture and tradition that are not only pro
the other utterances

perly factual but also subject to empirical falsification"[italicsmine].28
These include not only utterances found in the historyof Christianity,
as part of "the actual
The
life of the believer."
but those described
in the actual
life of the believer
"are not quite so ad
utterances
as are the biblical and histor
ventitious to this [Christian] witness"29
are told further that "since the Christian
We
ical ones.
life, like

human lifeotherwise, is quite impossiblewithoutmaking or implying

such claims, Christian belief, at least, has a necessary,
relation even to empirical falsification [italics mine]."30

if only indirect,

Thus there is faith itselfwhich underlies the proclamational
witness of faith,and it is the proclamation of faith,not faith itself,
which is falsifiable. But faith is, contraryto this claim, proclamational.
Ogden writes:
Faith as

such

ing knowledge

the extreme contrast to objectify
is obviously
. . . and this is true, even though, as itself a

type of understanding,faithIs quite distinct from immediate

28.

27.

"Falsification
Ibid.

29.

Ibid.

30.

Ibid., p. 43.

and Belief," p. 42.
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feeling and somehow identicalwith the other points lying

closer to the opposite
end of the continuum.
Insofar as it is
it is doubtful whether one can really speak of
conscious-and
an "unconscious
faith"?It is already explicit as some form of
belief, although such belief represents the maximum
sonal concern and involvement [italics mine].31

with

of per

Iffaith is both a strictlyexistentialphenomenon and yet identical

the other

points

the continuum,

along

that

is, forms of witness

and perhaps theology itself,itappears thatOgden is inconsistent.On
the one hand he describes

a continuum

from existential self-understand

ing (nonproclamational)to witness (unrefinedproclamation about the

to theology (highly reflective proclamation, account
self-understanding)
for
and the self-understanding).
both
witness
On the other hand
ing
he describes
the same continuum as containing, at its lower end, faith
as some sort of witness,
sort of proclamation.
The
i.e., as some

continuum appears to be entirelyconstructed of forms of (verbal)
proclamation (including faith),and yet Ogden denies that faith is

proclamation.
faith as proclamation
is to be understood as statements
Perhaps
correlated to beliefs about concern and
involvement. Ogden's
claims
about the necessary
connections
among Christian life, action,
empirical
and faith, support the interpretation that faith cannot be merely an
existential phenomenon;
that it must
result not only in existentially
falsifiable claims, but in empirically falsifiable claims as well.
That
faith is not unconscious
indicates that it is involved with believing

propositionswhich objectively describe reality,propositions that have

to mere existential
empirical
import as opposed
import. Yet Ogden
as
denies that the empirical utterances
the
believer's
life is
resulting
I fail to see how this claim can be success
lived are truly religious.32

made, given his other remarks. One possibilityis to suggest that
fully

But then what
every utterance of the believer is to be demythologized.
is the force of the "necessary"
in "necessary
ifonly indirect relation to
result from
empirical falsification," and why are the utterances which
the believer's
to the Christian witness as
life not quite so adventitious
the biblical or historical ones?
Several of Ogden's
comments suggest a

special role for these empiricalassertions, yet he denies that theyare
trulyreligious.

31.
32.

"Theologyand Objectivity,"p. 81.

"Falsification

and Theology,"

p. 43.
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In summary, Ogden
that the foundational religious asser
believes
tions are metaphysical
That is, they are neither empirically nor
only.
existentially falsifiable, but are open only to the "falsifiability" of self
contradiction.
Since
truths, showing them to be
they are necessary
is identical to showing them to be true. To show one to be
meaningful
false is to show it to be self-contradictory, and thus both meaningless
and necessarily
false.
Other
religious claims, those of the Christian
In other words,
since the world
witness, are existentially falsifiable.
it contains could have been different, claims about
and the creatures
are meaningful.
the world and other creatures
They are ultimately
in their mythical
since
meaningful, however, only as demythologized,
to be open to empirical falsification. Faith, as exis
form they appear
tential self-understanding,
underlies all these proclamations,
the major

differencesbetween witness and theology being that theology reflects
not only on faith but also on witness, and that the foundational theolo
are necessary
as well as existential.
The final cate
gical assertions
in the life of
of faith or faith as expressed
gory, that of the witness
not fit well
the believer, does
into Ogden's
of the con
description

tinuumfromfaithto theology. While Ogden denies the possibilityof
empiricallyfalsifiablereligiousassertions, some of his comments suggest
that the expressions of faith in the life?f the believer ought to be

as empirically falsifiable.
the continuum ought to
considered
Perhaps
be modified to account
for this matter.
there is an additional
Perhaps
on the lowest level of the continuum,
class of religious utterances
which would
then go from empirically falsifiable to existentially falsifi
able to unfalsifiable or necessary
statements.
last statements
These
have a twofold criterion of meaningfulness
(and thus truth); they are

verifiedby all experience and falsifiableonly in the special sense of
to the test of self-contradiction.
Such
being open
turns the continuum
into a continuum of assertions
existential

self-understanding.

The

original model

a

reconstruction

under which

would

have

lies

to place

life itselfon a continuum along with language. This is a continuum

which does

justice neither to language

nor to Ogden's

own claims.

III.

The confusion surrounding the continuum from faithto theology can
perhaps be cleared up by Ogden either by furtherexplanation and
exposition or by some modificationof the notions involved. Iwill not
say anything furtherabout it here. Rather, I turnmy attention to
threeother problems, all of which stand independently
of the confusion
in his general theory. The firstdeals with the necessary metaphysical
claims, the second with truthand meaningfulness,and the thirdwith
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the criterion of truth.
It
For Ogden,
"God exists" is a foundational religious assertion.
is what I have labeled a "necessary existential claim." As a necessary
and falsified by none.
existential claim, it is verified by all experience
If
In other words, any state of affairs shows the assertion to be true.

so, the existence of evil must not only be compatible with "God exists"
but show it to be true. On a traditional view of God, the existence of
of so much
evil, or at least the existence
seemingly gratuitous evil,
counts against the claim that "God exists," not for it. But then Ogden
his view of God as process
is not a traditional theologian.
Perhaps
that God exists.
allows him to take evil as support for the assertion
If so, this criticism comes
to no more than noting that the process

God is less than satisfyingto thosewho do not thinkevil should count
in favor of God's
The

second

existence.33
problem

is perhaps

more

substantial.

Normally

the

a belief is connected to showing the proposition
notion of justifying

believed to be true.
one might suspect.

In Ogden's
is stronger than
case, this connection
Recall that on the level of necessary
statements,

to be meaningful is identical to showing
to be true.
showing
I
on this
with
not
would
the
further
claim
that
think,
Ogden
disagree,
one
to
to
in
need
show
be
Thus
level,
only
meaningful.
justify
this limitedcase, the notion of truth is collapsed into the notion of

That
is, the criterion of truth is the same as the
meaningfulness.
unex
This is to be expected.
criterion of meaningfulness.
Something
same
on
true
is
that
the
claim
is
the
lower
levels, the
pected, however,
levels of contingent metaphysical
and
assertions, mythical assertions,
assertions.
empirical
or
definition of truth as
Ogden's
"worthy of being believed"
a
one
credence"
much
sounds
like
make
very
"deserving
might
judgment

in attemptingto justifya belief.

In attemptingto justifya religious

belief to another person, am I not, in part, recommending
that belief to
In Ogden's
one justifies
her? At least that is the goal.
when
program,
a theological assertion, one has two ends:
to check the assertion's
vis ? vis itsmeaning and the Christian witness, and to
appropriateness

vis ? vis itsmeaning and truth.One is
check on itsunderstandability
to
belief
make
attempting
religious
meaningfuland hence acceptable.
Some
toward

theists holding a
God's

existence.

traditionalview of God
See

Michael

L.

think that evil may count

Peterson,

Problem of Evil," American Philosophical Quarterly 20

40.

"Recent

Work

on

(October 1983):
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the

321

on

But to check

its meaning

is to do

existentiallyfalsifiable.Once
has one

justified the belief?

no more

than to show

that it is

is shown to be meaningful in thisway,

I think Ogden's

answer

must

be

"yes."

If

so, isn'the committed to recommending forbelief? And ifhe is so
committed,how is showing meaningfuldifferentfromshowing true?
It looks as if
what should probably be trueonly of necessary assertions
on the lower levels of the continuum, viz.,
is true also of assertions
it is true. This is, at best, a curious
is meaningful
that ifan assertion
it. One
is to deny that
result. There are at least two ways around
The second
truth is to be defined as "worthy of belief."
is to deny

thatshowing

to be justifiedis identicalwith showing

to be mean

I will not comment on the second
I will suggest,
of these.
ingful.
however, one reason, related to the third problem, to opt for the first.

The thirdproblem is perhaps best exemplified by considering

statement of the criterion for the truth of myths.
Mythical
Ogden's
are true "insofar as
our unforfeitable
assertions
they so explicate

assurance that life Is worthwhile that the understandingof faiththey
represent cannot be falsifiedby the essential conditions of life itself
[italicshis].34 My concern is with the force of "cannot be falsified."

criteria for truth are
different criterion for each

The

to vary field to field.
class
of statements.

There
is to be a
if the criterion

But

for mythical truth is any indication,that claim must be false on

own grounds.
The criterion for the truth of myth reads as if
Ogden's
it simply, must correspond
to
to the facts
assertions,
put
mythical
life. Couldn't a similar claim be made about an empirical asser
about
I suggest
the following:
For example, couldn't
scientific asser
tion?
tions are true insofar as they so explicate our beliefs about the exter
of the external world they represent
nal world that the understanding
cannot be falsified by the essential
facts of the external world
itself?

Isn't the criterionof truthreallymore basic than either of these two
suggested criteria; isn't it just thatany statement is true,so long as
it
it explicates our belief that p, such that the understandingof
the
fact
that
cannot
be
falsified
by
represents
p?
Perhaps Ogden might reply that "cannot be falsified"should be
interpreted

in a

stronger

sense

than

I have

allowed

here.

It seems

open to suggest thatmythical assertions cannot be falsifiedby any
That is, either "cannot
state of affairs. But this leads to a dilemma.
means
to
that mythical assertions,
be true, must be neces
be falsified"
existential
claims about
sary assertions
(which contradicts
Ogden's

34.

"Myth and Truth," p. 116.
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to the
"must correspond
falsification), or "cannot be falsified" means
the criteria for truth and
the distinction between
facts", inwhich case
for a
of truth is blurred (which indicates the necessity
the meaning
modification of Ogden's views on truth).
The force of these last two criticisms, along with the confusion
in section
fundamental
that there are some
noted
II, is to suggest

needs to deal.
His notions of truth,
Ogden
when
taken
and
together against
meaning,
justification,

issues with which

falsification,

Professor

the background of his general theoryof religious language, lead to

subtle incoherencies.
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